GEOPOLITICAL STORM AND UNCLEAR SYSTEMIC FUTURE - CONCLUSIONS | publicatii - Politica La Est
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GEOPOLITICAL STORM AND UNCLEAR SYSTEMIC FUTURE - CONCLUSIONS

Ceea ce s-a intamplat in sistemul international de state in ultimele saptamani- practic de la sfarsitul lui octombrie pana azi- arata ca s-a adancit criza sistemica, a ordinei liberale globale. Decesul virtual al acesteia a fost anuntat intr-un articol ramas ca premonitoriu , semnat de Richard Haas , presedintele ‘Council of Foreign Relations- SUA’  , publicat la 21 martie 2018.  Intitulat , “Liberal World Order, R.I.P.”  el reprezenta un ferpar/  realist la disparitia asezamintelor instalate sistemic dupa al Doilea Razboi Mondial si, mai ales, de la finele Razboiului Rece. Problema ordinei globale azi, face  clar autorul  din primul paragraph al articolului , este ca “ fading liberal world order is neither liberal nor worldwide nor orderly” . [1] In scopul de a evita repetarea conflagratiilor mondiale , “the democratic countries set out to create an international system that was liberal in the sense that it was to be based on the rule of law and respect for countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. Human rights were to be protected. All this was to be applied to the entire planet; at the same time, participation was open to all and voluntary. Institutions were built to promote peace (the United Nations), economic development (the World Bank) and trade and investment (the International Monetary Fund and what years later became the World Trade Organization).[2] Asadar, ordinea liberala globala este “ in curs de evaporare”- daca nu a decedat de-a binelea-  ,  caracterul ei liberal fiind dat de faptul istoric , real in buna masura , ca elaborarea ei a fost rodul eforturilor statelor democratice, iar apararea a fost exercitata de hegemonul american, cea mai mare democratie actuala.
            Expertii rusi impartasesc si ei aceasta opinie. S Karaganov si  D. Suslov scriu intr-un articol, publicat la sfarsitul lunii octombrie 2018 ca : “Since around 2017–2018, the world has been living through a period of progressive erosion, or collapse, of international orders inherited from the past. With the election of Donald Trump and the rapid increase of US containment of Russia and China—which is both a consequence of this gradual erosion and also represents deep internal and international contradictions—this process entered its apogee. A period of collapse opens up possibilities for the creation of a new world order; hopefully, a fairer, stable, and peaceful order than has been previously experienced. Russia has a good chance of influencing the formation a new order.However, the establishment of a new world order will take time, and in the meantime serious conflicts and crises could occur.”[3]
            O alta  demonstratie a evidentei ca dosarul noii ordini globale este pe agenda actuala a jucatorilor sistemici de importanta  este si faptul ca reuniunea care urmeaza sa aiba loc intre 8 si 10 ianuarie 2019 la New Delhi , principala conferinta de securitate internationala gazduita de  India- ‘Raisina Dialogue’-  are ca tema   “ A world Reorder- New Geometries Fluid Partnerships Uncertain Outcomes[4]  si se bucura de participarea unui larg segment de teoreticieni ( experti in stiinte politice, profesori de relatii internationale, etc. ) si practicieni  ( sefi de guverne, ministri si fosti ministri, militari de rang inalt, etc. ) dintr-un mare numar de tari. O prezentare a acestei reuniunei anuale fundamenteaza titlul ales pentru dezbaterea din acest an in felul urmator: “Every year, the Raisina Dialogue convenes experts from a diverse cross-section of disciplines and professions to address the most challenging issues facing the global community. It is fair to say that for the past few years, the common sentiment is that we live in an age of ‘disruption,’  given the upheavals that have characterized global politics over the last decade. As the dialogue prepares to convene once again in 2019, the world is evolving in response to these disruptions. Older systems of management are straining or already broken, but the new regimes, rules, and concepts that could replace them are still forming. This year, Raisina will take stock of the immediate consequences of these disruptions, and explore how these consequences inform our visions of the emerging world order.The redrawing of our mental maps of the world is perhaps the most consequential development.” [5]
 
             Asadar, reformularea hartii mentale a lumii este un process in curs datorat epocii  de “ rupture”  pe care o parcurgem si provocarilor multiple aflate  in fata sistemul international. Socotind ordinea post-1945  ca “dizolvata“  intr-o “ competitie haotica de putere” , evidentiind faptul ca guvernanta globala gliseaza de la statele-natiune catre  “ retele descentralizate  si difuze” in care guvernele sunt doar unul dintre actori , este imperativ de a studia daca  raman efective traditionalele canale ale diplomatiei si a stabili daca diferitele viziuni  existente ,  regionale  sau nationale,  pot fi compulsate intr-o paradigma unica de ordine globala . [6]
 
            De altfel, in cursul anului 2018, in SUA au aparut numeroase  articole referitoare la dosarul asezamintelor mondiale successive, fiind evidentiat astfel, prin chiar structura analizei intreprinse, ca autorii inteleg ca ne aflam in perioada unei treceri de la vechea ordine post- al Doilea Razboi Mondial si post-Razboi Rece catre alta despre care avem prea putine certitudini  . Unii analisti afirma chiar direct acest lucru si incearca sa prognozeze cum va fi aceasta noua ordine globala, asadar suntem in prezenta unui set variat si amplu de supozitii.
             Ceea ce este déjà o naratiune care tinde sa devina dominanta in cercurile de experti in relatiile internationale in ultimul an a ajuns in cercurile largi de interesati in evolutia politicii globale. Nu doar expertii , care sunt chemati sa raspunda numeroaselor intrebari pe care le ridica situatia ordinei sistemice  actuale , dar cititorii familiarizati cu scena globala se avanta sa gaseasca explicatii la ceea ce se intampla , mai mult sa ia in considerare ipoteze de viitor. La un articol publicat de Gideon Rachman in “ Financial Times” – practic o recenzie facuta la trei carti care ‘ataca ‘ aceasta chestiune a ordinei globale sub titlul: “ Is western democracy in danger?” – cititorii incearca sa dezvaluie motivatii ale deteriorarii ordinei globale , momentul de inceput al acestui process dizolvant  si sa gandeasca la viitor, imaginandu-l potrivit propriei propensiuni politico-sociale.  Unul dintre acestia scrie in comentariul sau : “What has changed over the past 3-4 decades? 1) The power of the state has grown enormously (along with the financial needs of the state to eat more and more of your paycheck). 2) This grotesquely inflated state has been captured by international financial cartels on the one hand, and special interest groups on the other. Increasingly the two work hand in glove. The effect felt by most citizens living in these new "democracies" is that you have less disposable real income, while the things you must pay for (schooling, health care, housing) have become bizarrely expensive and yet crappified all at once. Attempts to organize responses within traditional party organizations lead to powerful voices mouthing soothing words and then doing the opposite of what they promised. When you complain you are called every ist name under the sun.This is why Trump won. Why Brexit passed.Do you wish to save democracy? Simple. Reinstate the sacred bond between the citizen/voter and the state that supposedly serves us. Teach our children to respect this bond. Hell, I'd settle for state schools just not telling them it's a lie. Treat citizens as the foundation of democratic society. Value us. Then we will save democracy.” [7] Un alt cititor, in  comentariul sau , se declara socat de evenimente care au loc si nu se inscriu, in ultimii ani , in evolutia predictibila a vietii internationale, ceea ce ar arata  ca ceva este in neregula cu  ordine globala si evolutia democratica , pana recent socotita triumfatoare  : “I'm really quite shocked by what I've been hearing in Britain. Of course there have been extremists from the British Union of Fascists to the BNP but what's more worrying is the extremism from the ruling party:1. The serious threats by a cabinet minister to consider a mass deportation of millions of people from the UK.2. The threat of war on Spain by a former leader of the Conservative party.3. The push to rip up the peace deal in Northern Ireland.4. The very serious attacks on our democratic institutions from judges to the ONS, to any form of expert.I guess the big question is how will the nationalists in Britain react as things get worse? Unfortunately the examples from history as all that as economies worsen, extremism gets worse too.”[8]
 
            Naratiunea dominanta privind viitorul ordinei globale liberale – adica intemeiata si sustinuta  vreme de 70 de ani de statele democratice liberale-   s-a cristalizat treptat , dupa criza economica si financiara globala  inceputa in 2008. Contestatia ordinei internationale de catre Rusia- razboiul din august 2008 cu  Georgia si, mai ales, anexarea Crimeii ( martie 2014) , dar si activismul international al Moscovei , vadit din 2015 in Siria, dupa cateva decenii revenind astfel ca jucator in aceasta regiune importanta a planetei care este Mideast si aspiratia  ei declarata catre o organizare multilaterala a sistemului au mers constant in tandem cu cresterea economica a Chinei. Aceasta din urma tara a devenit cea dintai ca volum economic in 2013 , marcand astfel, in comparatia cu SUA, indatorata substantial si implicata in razboaie fara sfarsit previzibil in Afganistan si Irak , un salt sistemic urias, care nu putea sa nu aiba consecinte rapide. Lansarea in 2011 a marii strategii a Chinei- One Belt , One Road/OBOR/ New Silk Road – a avut rezultate surprinzatoare, expandand dincolo de asteptari greutatea sistemica a Chinei , care devenit un jucator de elita in regiuni unde nu fusese prezent anterior ( Europa de Est este, de pilda, un exemplu )
            Concomitent acestei evolutii s-a cristalizat si supozitia ca SUA a intrat intr-o perioada de declin economic si militar cu consecintele sistemice evidente. Din aceasta perspectiva, mandatele lui B. Obama au aratat ca este dificil deopotriva sa incheie razboaiele in curs- chiar daca le declari official  sfarsite – si la fel de greu este sa reorientezi marea strategie americana potrivit noilor realitati. In 2011 Obama a proclamat asa-numitul ‘ pivot asiatic’ , deci fiind decisa ‘ mutarea ‘ din Europa in Asia a fortei sistemice a SUA pe potriva vizibilizarii tot mai accentuate a deplasarii centrului de greutate al politicii mondiale ( dupa cinci sute de ani de dominatie ) din spatial euro-atlantic in Asia ( ceea ce Gideon Rachman a teoretizat si substantiat prin date empirice  intr-o carte celebra déjà , intitulata  “ Easternization” publicata in 2017 ) .  Noul cadru de evolutie politica strategica globala a impus reorientari ale statelor, atat a celor cu greutate mare  in sistem, cat si a celor de talie mijlocie  sau mica ( cu eforturi ale acestora de a se pozitiona regional cat mai bine in functie de jucatorii de  talie majora  ). In cadrul ‘ligii intai’ , atat Rusia , care se pregateste intens pentru a se pozitiona in acest inceput de noua ordine globala  pe aliniamente  cat mai favorabile ( mai ales strategic ), cat si SUA ( prin alegerea neasteptata a lui Trump in noiembrie 2016 si lansarea unei politici externe  radical deosebita de cea urmata pana atunci )  sau UK ( care a decis parasirea UE pronuntand Brexit in 2016 ), inclusiv deci si UE , care a pierdut astfel un actor de mare importanta si  este chemata cat mai rapid sa –si defineasca viitorul.
            Deci punctele principale ale naratiunii dominante referind la  intrarea in perioada inlocuirii ordinei globale liberale sunt: cresterea Chinei este insotita de declinul multilateral ca hegemon sistemic al SUA ( inclusiv schimbarea dramatica a politicii Washingtonuilui in era Trump, radical diferita de cea din utlimii 70 de ani ); Rusia si China , dedicate multilateralismului, incheaga noi grupari  geopolitice , UE tinde sa devina actor global in pofida unei eroziuni interne accentuate, Orientul Mijlociu se detaseaza ca scena unei rasturnari geopolitice greu de inteles, dar in care Israelul devine aliat taberei sunnite impotriva Iranului. Etc.
            Toate aceste schimbari geopolitice de anvergura sunt insotite de o criza interna masiva a democratiei la nivel global, ea fiind nu atat slabita de concurenta modelului illiberal sau celui autoritarist  ( China si Rusia ), cat de slabiciunea interna vadita in principalele state democratice.
            Putem desprinde asadar primele  concluzii specifice subiectului constructiei  noii ordini globale in perioada actuala.
            Cea dintai concluzie considera faptul ca exista déjà un pattern  mental  in segmentul expertilor si practicienilor relatiilor externe ca ordinea post- 1945 s-a epuizat ca sistem de guvernanta si functionalitate sistemica  globala si ca e necesar sa fie explorate  opiniile expertilor si practicienilor asupra acestei realitati si a modalitatii de a gestiona in viitor afacerile internationale  prin reconcilierea diverselor puncte de vedere existente. Iar acest lucu ar trebui sa se intample inainte ca miscari neasteptate pe arena globala sau voluntarismul unor lideri or aparitia si permanentizarea haosului sa nu duca la un raboi generalizat.
            A doua concluzie refera la faptul ca exista o naratiune déjà devenita dominanta privind motivatia acestei dizolvari – inca nefinisate- a ordinei globale actuale, intre care se aseaza la loc de frunte schimbarea ierarhiei de putere la nivel international, caracterizata de cresterea Chinei si declinul SUA si instalarea competitiei de putere  intre marii actori ( in cazul SUA este afirmat deschis acest lucru ) . Acest  process este  astazi  in curs si a inregistrat evenimente neasteptate – precum Brexit, anexarea Crimeei de catre Rusia ,  alegerea ca presedinte al SUA a lui D. Trump si asumarea unui alt curs de politica externa al hegemonului, schimbarea peisajului geopolitic in Orientul Mijlociu , reactivarea unor zone de conflict aflate geografic la zonele de contact intre puterile mari.
            In sfarsit , dar nu in cele din urma,  a treia concluzie evidentiaza  faptul ca dizolvarea ordinei globale post- 1945 este simultana unui proces de slabire a democratiei liberale  la nivel global, in statele democratice de lunga traditie fiind evidente semnele unei recrudescente a nationalismului/populismului/ extremismului considerate pana de curand cvasieradicate sistemic. Slabiciunile democratiei liberale  se manifesta in conditiile  consolidarii unor  modele alternative, cum ar fi cele ale iliberalismului ( Polonia, Ungaria )  sau autoritarismului  ( China, Rusia |), care se afla in expansiune.  Cum remarca sintetic Richard Haass : “ Liberalism is in retreat. Democracies are feeling the effects of growing populism. Parties of the political extremes have gained ground in Europe. The vote in the United Kingdom in favor of leaving the EU attested to the loss of elite influence. Even the US is experiencing unprecedented attacks from its own president on the country’s media, courts, and law-enforcement institutions. Authoritarian systems, including China, Russia, and Turkey, have become even more top-heavy. Countries such as Hungary and Poland seem uninterested in the fate of their young democracies.[9] O notatie interesanta face G. Rachman in legatura cu aceasta chestiune preocupanta  scotand in relief faptul ca schimbarile de mentalitate si orientarile de opinie sunt fulgeratoare la scara istorica: “Could democracy die in the US? Is a new wave of authoritarianism sweeping the world? Is the west about to be engulfed by civil conflict?Questions such as these would have seemed hysterical as recently as 2015. But they are now the subject of mainstream political discussion.[10] Iar ca fundamentare a acestei evidente translatii de mentalitate la nivelul statelor cu democratie consolidata, tot el citeaza date empirice ingrijoratoare: “less than a third of millennials in America believe that it is extremely important to live in a democracy, compared with over two-thirds of older Americans. In 1995, just one in 16 Americans favoured military rule over democracy. By 2011, this had risen to one in six — with young, wealthy Americans particularly likely to favour this option./…/this is not a uniquely American trend. Surveys suggest that support for the idea of military rule has also been rising in other established democracies such as the UK, India and Germany.” [11]
 
            O realitate predominanta a scenei globale actuale  este faptul ca , in acest proces de disolutie a ordinei liberale actuale, atat SUA, cat si Europa ( UE ) detin un rol foarte important, daca nu decisiv. Nu atat datorita faptului ca , in ultimele sapte decenii,  ele au fost garantii acesteia – nu excludem nici aportul Rusiei la formatarea acestei ordini, iar apoi, la sfarsitul Razboiului Rece , la eficientizarea ei - , dar si pentru ca  in ultimele secole zona euro-atlantica a detinut primatul sistemic global. Orice analiza a succesiunii hegemonice inregistrata din urma cu 500 de ani mentioneaza ca detinand rolul de hegemon state din zona euro-atlantica- Portugalia, Spania ,  Olanda, UK sau SUA- astfel ca declinul hegemoniei Americii si ‘ easternization” , asadar mutarea centralitatii sistemice in Asia , proiecteaza transatlantismului  ( SUA si UE )  un rol subsidiar/subordonat/ non-central.
            O nuanta interesanta a acestui proces in dezvoltare  este ca evolutiile recente arata faptul ca statele occidentale- promotoare ale democratiei liberale- cu deosebire SUA si cele ale Uniunea Europeana- nu manifesta o preocupare de intarire a legaturilor reciproce  pentru a depasi actualul moment istoric si, in ultima instanta , sa conserve propriul loc in ierarhia mondiala. Mai mult, politica lui Trump de admonestare a aliatilor si de lansare a unor veritabile campanii de acuzare  a lor ( cazul Germaniei privind North Stream -2 la summit-ul de la Bruxelles in celebrul breakfast din iulie 2018 sau al Frantei  la 10 noiembrie 2018 ca replica la afirmatia lui Macron privind “ armata europeana” )  nu contribuie cu nimic, ci dimpotriva,  la consolidarea relatiei transatlantice. Intr-un articol recent- intiulat sugestiv “ Europe in Disarray” , R. Haass trece in revista ceea ce se intampla in Europa azi , afirmand ca aceste fenomene negative care fac batranul continent vulnerabil la amenintarile actuale sunt rezultatul unor greseli facute de elitele de conducere europeana, incapabile sa faca un management performant.  Iata ‘ tabloul Haas’  al Europei de azi “It was not all that long ago – just a few years, as hard as that it is to believe – that Europe appeared to be the part of the world most closely resembling the end-of-history idyll depicted by Francis Fukuyama at the end of the Cold War. Democracy, prosperity, and peace all seemed firmly entrenched. Not anymore. Parts of Paris are literally burning. The United Kingdom is consumed and divided by Brexit. Italy is led by an unwieldy left-right coalition that is resisting EU budget rules. Germany is contending with a political realignment and in the early phases of a transition to a new leader. Hungary and Poland have embraced the illiberalism seen across much of the world. Spain is confronting Catalan nationalism. And Russia is committing new acts of aggression against Ukraine. In what by historical standards constitutes an instant, the future of democracy, prosperity, and peace in Europe has become uncertain. Much of what had been widely assumed to be settled is not. NATO’s rapid demobilization after the Cold War looks premature and precipitous.[12] Atrage atentia faptul ca autorul insista pe faptul ca retragerea trupelor americane din Europa la sfarsitul Razboiului Rece- de la mai bine de 400 000 militari in 1990 la circa 35 000 azi- a fost prematura si precipitata, ceea ce ar fi la baza starii de ‘ disarray’ pe batranul continent. Comentariile cititorilor la ‘ tabloul Haass’ n-au intarziat sa fie adverse. Iata finalul  unuia dintre ele :  , European leaders are tackling the issues he points out – migration, climate change, security and defence. What he deems most important is to stop the Nord Stream II pipeline and wean Europe from Russian gas, and to rein in Russian influence. In the era of Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, the European legacy of open societies based on rights, obligations and individual freedoms has been under attack. Democratic governance is not a given in much of the world, apart from the Transatlantic  endeavour to uphold the Western-led global order. Despite Trump’s hostility toward Europe, and even though the EU is in disarray, we, Europeans are still ready to defend the last bastion of liberal values. It is premature to predict doom for Europe’s “future of democracy, prosperity, and peace.[13]
            Un analist de talia lui Judt Dempsey de la Carnegie Europe este foarte aspra sau, mai degraba,  realista in a caracteriza stadiul actual al solidei relatii transatlantice de odinioara in felul urmator : “Whether it’s Brexit, the European Parliament elections, who will take over the leadership of the EU’s institutions, or which political parties will come out top in regional elections in Germany, they are all distractions. They are distractions because they ignore the bigger, more important picture that is unfolding between Europe and the United States. The post-1945 transatlantic relationship is coming to an end. President Donald Trump, whom most European leaders bash, mock, and patronize as if he was responsible for Europe’s woes and weaknesses, has thrown down the gauntlet to America’s allies. But they are unwilling to respond because it would mean accepting the reality and responsibility.” [14]
            Dincolo insa de aceste semne ale tensiunilor interne pe batranul continent  ( si in vechea alianta trasatlantica ) trebuie evaluate, din  perspectiva sistemica, care pot fi consecintele acestora. Daca in alte parti ale planetei cu importanta geopolitica sunt observabile constituirea sau lansarea procesului de cladire a unei noi ordini regionale, este posibil ca Europa sa urmeze un drum similar. China se straduieste sa instituie , de pilda, propria hegemonie in Marea Chinei de Sud, iar eforturile in aceasta directie sunt deopotriva politico-diplomatice si militare ( construirea pe insule artificiale de instalati militare, solicitarea de permis de acces  in acvatoriu, etc. ) , iar in Mideast sunt analisti care arata ca déjà exista o alta ordine regionala implementata in  ultimul timp. Intr-o analiza recenta se evalueaza transformarea recenta din aceasta perspectiva intervenita in Mideast,inca nefinalizata : “The era of chaos in the Middle East is drawing to a close, and a new phase, which contains its own set of dangers, is taking shape, a senior former intelligence official has told J/ewish /N/ews/ S/yndicate/. Brig. Gen. (res.) Eli Ben Meir, former head of the Assessment Department at the Israel Defense Force’s Military Intelligence Directorate, said the period of the ‘Arab Spring’ , marked by tectonic instability and dramatic changes, is drawing to a close and the involvement of external elements in failed states, as old orders fell apart. ‘ In recent years … one would get up in the morning and didn’t know who controlled Syria, or what was happening in Iraq and Yemen,’  said Ben Meir, who headed the strategically vital Assessment Department in 2015 and at the start of 2016. ‚ This was a period in which frameworks broke apart, and the old order underwent change. But from 2018 onwards, those states that were a mess have begun stabilizing. The assessment is that this will continue in the coming year’ .”[15]
            Episodul contondentei masive  dintre SUA si Europa in chestiunea ‚ armatei europene’ , cu cote inalte de nervozitate , cum a fost cu ocazia centenarului Armistitiului din  noiembrie 2018, arata ca Europa nu exclude luarea in considerare a formatarii in perspectiva a unei noi ordini regionale,  exclusiv europene, parte a noii ordini globale viitoare.   Este o concluzie preliminara  in analiza noastra , ea avand a fi substantiata pentru a fi amendata sau parasita in evaluarea proceselor inca in curs de dezvoltare  , cum ar fi finalizarea celui  de abandonare de catre SUA a tratatului INF din 1987 sau in evolutiile din  dosarul iranian . La urma urmelor , SUA au declansat acest proces de chestionare a viabilitatii aliantelor ordinei post-1945, iar presedintelui Trump i-au trebuit cateva luni de zile si presiuni enorme pentru a recunoaste valabilitatea articolului V din Tratatul NATO, iar Europa nu poate sa nu ia in considerare acest lucru si sa-si programeze viitorul. Un scenariu imaginat de Carl Bildt privind relatia SUA-UE  intr-un recent articol nu ar fi putut fi gandit  acum doi sau trei ani : „Moreover, Europe’s external environment has become more dangerous. Though the world’s attention is currently fixed on the risks of an escalating Sino-American trade war, the threat of an equally destructive transatlantic conflict cannot be ignored. Trump seems genuinely to believe that German cars on the streets of New York pose a threat to US national security. Should he wake up one morning and decide to impose heavy import tariffs on European cars, things could get very ugly, very fast. Many European policymakers, already convinced that the US-based tech giants are a threat to European security, would welcome the opportunity to pursue stronger actions against them. If the US responded in kind, the casualties would pile up quickly. [16] Subliniind ca, in afara diferendelor mentionate cu SUA, Europa are a se confrunta cu amenintari multiple la periferiile sale, inclusiv cu un razboi in Estul Europei ( implicand  Rusia si Ucraina ) pe care agenda de lucru externa  a UE pare sa nu-l observe [17], Carl Bildt isi incheie analiza din care am citat : “whereas 2018 was a year of confusion, 2019 will be year for decision-making. European leaders must face up to the brutal realities of a changing world. Only then will voters trust them to forge a new path toward a future of peace and prosperity.[18]
            Ceea ce trebuie spus inca este ca s-au multiplicat  in ultimele luni nu doar contondentele in legatura transatlantica- parte asadar a unui larg proces de reconfigurare a aliantelor geopolitice la nivel regional sau global -, dar s-au conturat noi parteneriate cu rol deschis afirmat de a utiliza  propria greutate in edificarea  noii ordini globale . In aceasta privinta este edificator exemplul adancirii parteneriatului China- Rusia- India cu ocazia reuniunii G-20 din Argentina ( decembrie 2018 )  prin reuniunea celor trei lideri ai marilor puteri in cauza. Mai degraba decat o alianta geopolitica , in masura sa domine Eurasia, cum s-a speculat a se intentiona in aceasta reuniune, rezultatul ei se inscrie in efortul Moscovei si al partenerilor sai  de a ingradi comportamentul unilateral al SUA, asa cum arata doi specialisti reputati rusi :  „Russia will continue to deepen partnerships with China and India and to enhance cooperative relations with US allies and partners like Japan, South Korea, and, when possible, Western European countries. Neither major European allies nor Asian allies of the US support further escalation of the Russia-West and US-Russia confrontation. Maintaining these relationships seems the best way to forward the confrontation’s conclusion on terms compatible with the current state of the world. „ [19]
            Evenimentele care au fost selectionate in acest studiu in efortul de a da masura “furtunii geopolitice” din ansamblul sistemului international de state in ultimele doua luni si mai bine corespund unui trend accelerat al destramarii ordinei post-Razboi Rece, fara a fi insa imaginate optiunile pentru ordinea viitorului, Desigur, in literatura consultata exista si asemenea eforturi teoretice , dar intentia noastra a fost ca, mai degraba, sa fie vizibilizat trendul amintit, ceea ce de altfel a fost si motivatia  selectionarii evenimentelor. Pentru ca ele au tintit sa evidentieze ceea ce este foarte alarmant pentru Europa- adancirea faliei transatlantice, ca in cazul “ armatei europene”- si rolul ei in scadere  in promovarea liberalismului pe plan international- fenomenul “ vestele galbene” -, care este ritmul de angajare in “ capcana lui Tucidide” a celor doi mari concurenti actuali la hegemonia sistemica ( dosarul China-SUA- incidentul Huawei ) sau de evitare  a acesteia, deopotriva evolutiile  actuale neasteptate  in ansamblul unei regiuni volatile , cum este Mideast ( cazul Khasshogi ).
            Viitorul , adica reconfigurarea ordinei globale, intrarea in perioada post-ordinea globala liberala, se plamadeste in  desfasurarea zilnica a afacerilor internationale, ultimele doua luni vadind o accelerare  aproape fara egal istoric a acestui proces. 
 
Bucuresti
                                                                                                8 ianuarie 2019
 
[1] Richard N. Haass, Liberal World Order, R.I.P. The liberal world order is under threat from its principal architect: the United States. March 21, 2018-https://www.cfr.org/article/liberal-world-order-rip
[2] Ibidem
[3] Serghei Karaganov, Dmitry Suslov, A New World Order: A View form Russia, in  “Russia in Global Affairs”, 4 October 2018, -https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/A-new-world-order-A-view-from-Russia—19782
[5] Samir Saran, Harsh V, Pant , Debating a World Order, January 2, 2019 -https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/debating-a-world-reorder/
[6] https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/RD_Programme.pdf-  sinteza introducere la panelul “ The Arrival of Global Politics: Navigating a Multi-perspective World Order”-  ”  The post-1945 world order, created and sustained by a small group of nations, has dissolved into an apparently chaotic contest for power infl uence involving individuals, institutions and states. As global governance moves away from states to more diffused and decentralised networks in which governments are but one player, can traditional channels of diplomacy and troubleshooting remain effective? Are new strategic cultures emerging that refl ect this new phase of globalisation? How are these tectonic shifts in power and infl uence seen by different regional and national worldviews, and can these differing perspectives be reconciled?”
 
[7] Gideon Rachman, Is western democracy in danger?, in ‘ Financial Times’, March 21, 2018- https://www.ft.com/content/2569065e-2b7a-11e8-a34a-7e7563b0b0f4 ; https://www.ft.com/content/2569065e-2b7a-11e8-a34a-7e7563b0b0f4#comments
 
 
[8][8] Ibidem
[9] Richard N. Haass, op.cit.
[10] Gideon Rachman , Is western democracy in danger?
[11] Ibidem
 
[12] Richard N. Haas, Europe in Disarray, in “ Project Syndicate” , 13 Dec.  2018-https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/growing-threats-to-europe-democracy-security-by-richard-n--haass-2018-12
 
[13] Ibidem
[14] Judy Dempsey, What Trump Means for Europe, in ’ Strategic Europe’, January 08, 2019 -http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/78075?lang=en
 
[15] Yaakov Lapin, A new Mideast order is taking shape, says ex-senior Israeli intelligence officer, January 7, 2019 / JNS-https://www.jns.org/a-new-mideast-order-is-taking-shape-ex-senior-israeli-intelligence-officer-says/
 
[16] Carl Bildt ,Decision Time for Europe,  “ Project Syndicate” , Dec 21, 2018 -https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/eu-leadership-in-2019-by-carl-bildt-2018-12
 
[17] La  2 ianuarie 2019 , Bildt scria pe contul sau de twitter ca “Well, there is a war going on in the East of Europe. That is of great concern and consequence. Why isn’t that on @FedericaMog agenda?” - https://twitter.com/carlbildt/status/1080378024078557184
 
[18] Carl Bildt, Decision Time….
[19] Serghei Karaganov, Dmitry Suslov, A New World Order: A View form Russia
 

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